Mu\u27Min v. Virginia--Content Questioning for Media Bias in Jury Selection: Ask Them No Questions, They\u27ll Tell You No Lies by Simeone, Jill
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 20
Number 2 Winter 1993 Article 4
1-1-1993
Mu'Min v. Virginia--Content Questioning for
Media Bias in Jury Selection: Ask Them No
Questions, They'll Tell You No Lies
Jill Simeone
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jill Simeone, Mu'Min v. Virginia--Content Questioning for Media Bias in Jury Selection: Ask Them No Questions, They'll Tell You No Lies, 20
Hastings Const. L.Q. 439 (1993).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol20/iss2/4
NOTES
Mu'Min v. Virginia-Content Questioning
for Media Bias in Jury Selection: Ask




Mass media communication networks have made an indelible mark
on the American jury trial. The prosecutions of Washington, D.C.
Mayor Marion Barry,' Oliver North,2 the Central Park jogger's assail-
ants,3 Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega,4 William Kennedy Smith,5
Jeffrey Dahmer,6 and the Los Angeles police who were charged with
beating Rodney King7 were all proceedings tried, to some extent, in liv-
ing rooms across America. As a result of media "overexposure," courts
have experienced increased difficulty in satisfying the Sixth Amend-
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to thank Susanne Aronowitz, Matthew Burke, Melissa Burke, Ted Franklin, Joanne Spalding,
and Marilyn Zola for their assistance on earlier drafts of this Note. She would also like to
thank Professors Wayne Woody and Scott Sundby for their insights at the project's concep-
tion, and Professor Kate Bloch for her support throughout. Finally, special thanks and appre-
ciation to Michael Wadman for his unyielding encouragement.
1. See, e.g., Mike Folks, Stephens Makes Case for Jurors in the Know, WAsH. TMES,
May 14, 1990, at Al.
2. See, ag., Newton Minow, 'Impartial' Juries: Trial By Ignorance, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
15, 1989, at A29; Michael Wines, Judge in North Case Angered by ABC News Report, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 1989, at A23.
3. Minow, supra note 2.
4. Mary T. Schmich, Picking Noriega Jury May Be A Tricky Task, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8,
1991, at C21.
5. Jury vs. Media Circus, USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 1991, at 12A.
6. Jurors Drawn from Extra-Large Pool, USA TODAY, Jan. 27, 1992, at 3A.
7. Linda Deutsch, Selection of Jury Begins in King Case; Jurisprudence: The Four Of-
ficers Watch Solemnly as the First Batch of Prospects Are Quizzed. Some Strong Opinions Are
Expressed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1992, at B1.
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ment's8 mandate that a defendant receive an impartial jury. Finding po-
tential jurors who are not prejudiced by negative publicity is a challenge
for courts trying a defendant for a notorious crime.
Voir dire is the only opportunity a defendant has to detect juror bias
resulting from media exposure. Voir dire, meaning "to speak the truth,"
involves routine questioning of potential jurors to gauge competence.9
Voir dire questions typically include inquiry about a potential juror's job,
family, education, prior convictions,- prior encounters with the police or
parties to the trial, knowledge of the trial, or prior jury service. 10 If the
questioning reveals a potential juror's bias, counsel may challenge that
juror "for cause."' 1 Voir dire also provides attorneys with information
they may use to exercise a limited number of "peremptory" challenges of
jurors without showing "cause" or legal basis for disqualification.1
2
While some jurisdictions allow expansive voir dire to enhance the mean-
ingfulness of peremptory challenges, others have restricted the process to
questions aimed at making challenges for cause.'
3
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, either the court or
the attorneys may conduct voir dire.'4 If the court conducts voir dire,
then the attorneys may submit reasonable questions for the court to ask
potential jurors.'" Because the judge determines the reasonableness of
the proposed queries, the court is the ultimate arbiter of what the jurors
will be asked.' 6
Voir dire procedure in state courts varies widely.' 7 The current
trend favors court-conducted voir dire because of its greater efficiency.' 8
8. The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The
Fourteenth Amendment imposes the right to trial by an impartial jury upon the states.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968).
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1412 (5th ed. 1979).
10. BNA Crim. Prac. Manual, 81:301-02 (Mar. 20, 1991).
11. A challenge for cause is "[a] request from a party to a judge that a certain prospective
juror not be allowed to be a member of the jury because of specified causes or reasons," such as
bias or a close relationship with one or more of the parties. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 9, at 209.
12. Peremptory challenges give attorneys "[t]he right to challenge a juror without as-
signing a reason for the challenge." Id. at 1023.
13. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 628 P.2d 869, 876-77, 879-80 (Cal. 1981) (expansive);
Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 481 A.2d 632, 640 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (restrictive). Restrictive
jurisdictions do not deny the parties peremptory challenges, they just do not allow them to ask
a range of questions upon which to base those challenges.
14. FED. R. CRaM. P. 24.
15. Id.
16. BNA Crim. Prac. Manual, supra note 10, at 81:301.
17. States are about evenly split on their voir dire procedure policies: some allow attor-
neys to direct voir dire, others place voir dire in the hands of the judge, and the remainder split
the duty between counsel and the court. JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES
282-84, App. D (1977).
18. BNA Crim. Prac. Manual, supra note 10, at 81:304.
MEDIA BIAS IN JURY SELECTION
Although busy dockets make the more streamlined process of judge-con-
ducted voir dire appealing, some states are concerned that the essence of
voir dire may be lost. Connecticut, for example, has safeguarded the
right to attorney voir dire in its state constitution.19 Jury selection ex-
perts agree that "attorneys have [an interest] in uncovering any potential
bias; whereas the judge, who is in a more neutral stance, may not be quite
as dedicated to asking follow-up questions .... " 2o Thus attorney-con-
ducted voir dire, though more time-consuming, has greater potential to
expose prejudice than judge-conducted voir dire.
One way to discover prejudice in a high-profile trial is through indi-
vidualized content questioning. Content questions involve eliciting spe-
cific details from each potential juror about the content of the publicity
she has encountered regarding the case.21 This procedure allows the
questioner to evaluate the impact of the media upon each juror.
When a state court judge alone conducts jury voir dire, the judge's
acceptance of a juror as qualified is only reviewable by a higher court for
"manifest error."22 The burden of proof for error is on the defendant.23
In the 1991 Mu'Min v. Virginia24 decision, the Supreme Court held that a
state trial judge's refusal to question prospective jurors during voir dire
in a capital punishment trial about the specific content of news reports
which they had seen did not violate either a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to an impartial jury or Fourteenth Amendment due process
guarantees. 25 The judge's limited voir dire in Mu'Min, mostly conducted
in a group format,26 created a difficult hurdle for the defendant to over-
come in proving jury prejudice. The lack of content questions may indi-
cate that the judge did not know to what extent news reports had affected
or prejudiced each juror. The empty record, however, provided insuffi-
cient evidence of a reversible error.
There are strong arguments for the stringent manifest error stan-
dard of review. From a public policy standpoint, there is an undeniable
19. "In all civil and criminal actions tried by a jury ... [t]he right to question each juror
individually by counsel shall be inviolate." CONN. CONsT., art. 1, § 19 (1965). See also, N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.15 (codifying attorney-conducted voir dire).
20. Symposium, Panel on the Selection and Function of the Modern Jury: What Empirical
Research Tells Us, and What We Need to Know About Juries and the Quest For Impartiality, 40
AM. U. L. REV. 547, 563 (1991). Judge Abner Mikva of the D.C. Circuit noted, "The judge
wants to get the voir dire over with as quickly as possible and seat the jury. As long as nothing
comes out in the questions that forces him to address a bias, he or she will pass it by; whereas
when the individual lawyers are doing it, obviously they are looking for bias." Id. at 564.
21. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1901 (1991).
22. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,
723 (1961)).
23. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985).
24. 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
25. See infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
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need for judicial expediency in the criminal justice system. When state
legislatures allow the trial judge to control the scope of voir dire, they
rein in a potentially limitless process. The costs to the defendant, how-
ever, can be substantial. This Note argues that the Mu'Min majority's
bright line rule that content questioning is unnecessary in media bias
cases wrongly tips the scale away from a defendant's Sixth Amendment
and Due Process rights in favor of judicial expedience without weighing
the costs of error in a capital punishment scenario.
This Note focuses on Supreme Court review of judicial voir dire in
state capital cases. Part I discusses the history of voir dire in media bias
cases. Part II addresses the standard of review for judge-conducted voir
dire. Part III centers on the Mu'Min decision and explores the tensions
between the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part IV ana-
lyzes the Mu'Min decision and its impact on Fourteenth Amendment
due process guarantees and finds that it has created a zone of unreview-
able judicial voir dire. Part V proposes that the weighty task of a capital
jury demands that a judge's voir dire substantially probe for juror bias.
Because the burden of proving impartiality is on the defendant, content
questioning is necessary in capital voir dire to assure that the defendant's
due process right to a meaningful appeal cannot be blocked by an empty
record.27 The proposal also notes that Mu'Min has effectively returned
the issue of content questioning to the states and suggests that local
courts and legislatures act affirmatively to fill the Mu'Min gap.
I. Voir Dire: Looking Back
A. The Origins of Jury Trial and Jury Selection
Many scholars believe that the Magna Carta was the first document
to guarantee a right to jury trial.28 English criminal juries predated the
Magna Carta, but defendants had to pay for them.29 Voir dire during
jury selection has a strong historical tradition although its focus has
changed over time. Contrary to current practice, Magna Carta era
courts chose juries for their knowledge of facts relating to the trial.30
27. See infra note 194. When a state grants defendants the right to appeal, that right must
be meaningful. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
28. See, eg., LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY
47-49 (1988) "While it is true that the main purpose of the charter was to make the king
subject to law, several provisions of the charter nonetheless referred to the right to trial by jury
.... A reading of the Magna Carta indicates that Article 36 is the one guaranteeing jury
trial." Id at 48-49.
29. Id. at 49. The English jury system was not the first: "Greece and Rome knew forms
of it, as did the Germanic tribes, the Scandinavians and the Normans. When the latter in-
vaded England and brought their own version, a native brand of local justice was already
flourishing on English soil." NATIONAL COLLEGE OF THE STATE JUDICIARY, JURY 5 (1975).
30. "Both parties had a right to be present at the election [of the jurors] and challenge for
good cause members of the proposed jury .... If it developed that the jury testified under oath
['Vol. 20:439
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Only jurors with pre-trial exposure to details and opinions about the case
sat on trials. 31 Continuing the tradition, colonial American courts also
preferred jurors who were knowledgeable about the facts of a case prior
to trial.
32
As revolutionary discourse peaked, however, Americans' mistrust of
public officials spawned an interest in guaranteeing a right to impartial
jurors.33 The first Continental Congress wrote in 1774 that "colonists
had the right to be 'tried by their peers.' ,34 The Sixth Amendment,
ratified as part of the Bill of Rights in 1791, states that "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartialjury ... .,3 Thus by the end of the eighteenth
century, Americans had incorporated lack of bias and impartiality into
the federal jury selection criteria.
It was not until 1968 that the constitutional right to an impartial
jury broadened beyond the federal justice system. Duncan v. Louisiana
3
1
held that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury applies to
states under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.37 Since
then, states and the Supreme Court have grappled with the definition of
"impartiality" and how to test jurors for it.
B. Jury Selection and Media Bias: Early Cases
The first American case in which a defendant challenged juror im-
partiality due to media taint was United States v. Burr.3' The trial was
over a very public conflict between Aaron Burr and President Thomas
Jefferson; the former had been accused of treason.39 Burr argued that to
avoid prejudice, he must be tried by jurors with no knowledge of the
that they were unacquainted with the facts, other jurors were summoned until there were 12
who had knowledge and who agreed. Knowledge did not mean first-hand knowledge, but
declarations of a juror's father or other equally reliable sources were sufficient." VALERIE
HANS AND NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 23-24 (1986).
31. Id
32. See Symposium, supra note 20, at 638.
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 at 616 (Alexander Hamilton) (New Am. Library Ed. 1961).
The Declaration of Independence, for example, chronicled the value of the jury trial among
early Americans and claimed that one of the reasons behind the desired separation from the
king was for "depriving [colonists], in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury." MOORE,
supra note 28, at 100.
34. PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 28 (1984).
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
36. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
37. Id. at 157-58.
38. 25 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694a).
39. R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 33
(1986) ("President [Jefferson] had no doubt that Burr's mysterious expedition down the Mis-
sissippi River was for the treasonable purpose of separating the Southwest from the Union.").
Burr was ultimately acquitted of these charges. Id at 34.
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case.4' Chief Justice John Marshall held that jurors do not have to be
ignorant of publicity, but they must base their verdict solely on in-court
testimony.41 Although Marshall was unwilling to uphold Burr's claim,
this case reflects a concern in early American judicial discourse about the
impact of adverse press on juror partiality.42
It was not until 1878 that the Court affirmatively stated that jurors
are impermissibly biased when pretrial exposure to media coverage of a
case leads them to form an opinion.4 3 In Reynolds v. United States,44 the
defendant appealed his conviction because one of the jurors stated in voir
dire that he "'believed' he had formed an opinion [based upon newspa-
per accounts] which he had never expressed, but which he did not think
would influence his verdict on hearing the testimony. ' 45 The Court held
that an "opinion" is more than an "impression" and the judge must de-
termine which is the more accurate characterization of each juror's state
of mind." The Reynolds Court concluded that "[a] juror who has
formed an opinion cannot be impartial." 47
C. Modern Media Bias Cases: The Legal Framework
The media bias issue resurfaced during the Warren Court era4 due
to the Court's focus on civil liberties. Since then, the Court has defined
and refined standards for evaluating the effects of prejudicial media on
jurors. The Court has devised two tiers of analysis for juror bias: a
Fourteenth Amendment presumption of prejudice test, first stated in Ir-
vin v. Dowd49 and later modified by Rideau v. Louisiana,50 and a Sixth
Amendment totality of circumstances test developed in Murphy v.
Florida.5 1
40. 1 REPORTS ON THE TRIALs OF COLONEL AARON BURR 416 (DaCapo Press 1969)
(1807).
41. Id.
42. Marshall wrote, "[L]ight impressions which may fairly be supposed to yield to the
testimony that may be offered; which may leave the mind open to a fair consideration of that
testimony, constitute no significant objection to a juror; but... those strong and deep impres-
sions, which will close the mind against the testimony that may be offered.., do constitute a
sufficient objection to him." Id.
43. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1878).
44. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
45. Id. at 156.
46. Id. at 157.
47. Id. at 155.
48. Earl Warren was Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court from 1953-69.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1722 (1988).
49. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
50. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
51. 421 U.S. 794 (1974).
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L The Presumption of Prejudice Test
The Irvin presumption of prejudice test looks at both the voir dire
testimony and the general tenor of the community for evidence that the
venire, the group of potential jurors from which the jury is selected, is
presumptively biased. 2
In 1961, the Supreme Court reviewed the conviction in Irvin v.
Dowd in light of extreme media bias allegations;"3 defendant Irvin
claimed denial of due process by an unconstitutionally partial jury. The
facts surrounding the Irvin trial are indeed dramatic. At the time of Ir-
vin's arrest, six murders were unsolved in his small Indiana community.
Shortly after Irvin's arrest for one of the murders, the police made widely
broadcast statements to the press telling the public that the defendant
had confessed to all six murders.54 The impact of the media upon the
county intensified as the trial approached.55 The record reflected that
ninety-five percent of the homes within the county received the newspa-
pers in which these highly prejudicial articles appeared. 56 Media satura-
tion was nearly complete.
During voir dire, two-thirds of the jurors ultimately empaneled
stated that they already thought the defendant was guilty.57 As one ad-
mitted, "You can't forget what you hear and see."' 58 Yet all the jurors
promised to be fair.59 Justice Clark, writing for the majority, explained
the contradiction of jurors ensuring impartiality when prejudice is obvi-
ous: "No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be
fair and impartial to the petitioner, but the psychological impact of re-
quiring such a declaration" before fellow jurors is often enough to inhibit
a member of the venire from admitting true bias.' The Court held that
the defendant did not receive due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because the jury was biased.61
52. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 726-29 (1961).
53. Id at 720.
54. Id at 725-26. "In many of the stories petitioner was described as the 'confessed slayer
of six."' Id. at 726. The media also revealed that the defendant had failed a lie detector test,
had prior unrelated convictions, had been identified in a police line-up, and had been court-
martialled while in the military for going AWOL. Id at 725.
55. "[P]etitioner had become a cause celebre of this small community--so much so that
curb stone opinions, not only as to petitioner's guilt but even as to what punishment he should
receive, were solicited and recorded on the public streets by a roving reporter, and later were
broadcast over the local stations." Id at 725.
56. Id.




61. Id. at 728. At the time of the Irvin decision, the Sixth Amendment right to a fair jury
trial had not yet been applied to the states. See, eg. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324
(1937). Any state that offered a defendant a right to jury trial had to ensure "a panel of
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Extremely hostile publicity within a community can create a pre-
sumption of prejudice.62 To evaluate whether the presumption applies,
the court must weigh the mental state of the community in light of the
media exposure.63 Irvin established a two-part test to evaluate juror bias:
(1) A court must look at the environment surrounding the trial for evi-
dence that the entire community is tainted by the media, and (2) the
court should examine the "sum total of the voir dire" testimony to see if
the empaneled jurors as a group harbor prejudice. 4
After examining the community setting of the Irvin trial, the Court
concluded that the "build-up of prejudice [within the community was]
clear and convincing."6 The Irvin court also examined the voir dire tes-
timony for evidence of jury bias. Considering that eight of the twelve
jurors admitted during voir dire that they already thought the defendant
was guilty, the court concluded that "the 'pattern of deep and bitter prej-
udice' shown to be present throughout the community ... was clearly
reflected in the sum total of the voir dire examination."66 The Court's
analysis of the community and the voir dire together revealed a presump-
tively prejudicial environment which failed to provide this defendant
with a fair trial under Fourteenth Amendment due process standards.
The Court's 1963 Rideau v. Louisiana67 decision modified the two-
prong Irvin test. Defendant Rideau was arrested for bank robbery, kid-
napping, and murder, then placed in the local jail.68 The police interro-
gated the defendant in jail and filmed and recorded the entire session.69
The "interview," which included a confession by the defendant in the
absence of counsel,70 was broadcast by local television stations for the
next few days.71 An estimated two-thirds of the community watched the
broadcasts.72
impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the
minimal standard of due process." Irvin, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948)). For this reason, the Irvin decision was based upon due process, rather than Sixth
Amendment grounds.
62. "It cannot be gainsaid that the force of this continued adverse publicity caused a
sustained excitement and fostered a strong prejudice among the people of Gibson County."
Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722.
63. Ia at 725-26.
64. Id. at 725-28.
65. Id. at 725.
66. Id. at 727 (citation omitted).
67. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
68. Id. at 723.
69. Id. at 724.
70. This decision predated the 1966 Miranda decision, which held that custodial interro-
gations are subject to Fifth Amendment protection and that a defendant must be warned of his
rights to an attorney and to remain silent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966).
71. Rideau, 373 U.S. at 724.
72. Id.
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The Rideau Court emphasized the impact of the televised confession
on the community as they evaluated whether the defendant had received
due process. "This spectacle, to the tens of thousands of people who saw
and heard it, in a very real sense was Rideau's trial-at which he pleaded
guilty to murder. Any subsequent court proceedings in a community so
pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could be but a hollow
formality." 73
Based solely upon the atmosphere within the community and with-
out consideration of voir dire testimony, the majority concluded that the
entire community was per se biased by the pre-trial media event and
overruled the trial judge's evaluation of jury impartiality.74
Rideau departed from Irvin by reducing the two-prong media bias
test into a single-prong test: community-wide taint alone may raise a
presumption of prejudice sufficient to deem the entire region biased and
therefore unsuitable as an impartial jury pool under Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process standards.75 The Rideau Court found sufficient preju-
dice in the televised confession to presume a biased jury. Without
focusing on the voir dire examination, it reversed the trial judge for sanc-
tioning a "kangaroo court.
'76
Presumption of prejudice analysis focuses on Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process requirements. Both Irvin and Rideau involved defend-
ants facing trial in communities where the bias generated by the media
precluded any opportunity for a fair adjudication. As the Court has
more recently stated, "Due process means a jury capable and willing to
decide the case solely on the evidence before it ....
2. The Totality of Circumstances Test
The Court presented a new test for juror bias in Murphy v. Florida.78
Defendant Murphy was convicted in a Florida state court for armed rob-
bery.79 His habeas corpus petition alleged that the jurors on his case
were predisposed to convict because of media accounts of his notorious
reputation as a thief.80
73. Id. at 726.
74. Id. at 726-27. The dissent criticized the majority for failing to establish a nexus be-
tween the environment and their conclusion of prejudicial taint. "Unless the adverse publicity
is shown by the record to have fatally infected the trial, there is simply no basis for the Court's
inference .... " Id. at 729 (Clark, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 726-27.
76. Id.
77. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982).
78. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
79. Id. at 795.
80. Murphy's credentials included participation in the theft of the Star of India sapphire
from a New York museum and the well-known nickname "Murph the Surf," given to him
because of his scurrilous behavior. Id.
Winter 19931
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A seven-member majority disagreed with his claims. Distinguishing
Murphy's case from Irvin and Rideau,"' the Court concluded that Mur-
phy's trial was not enveloped in an atmosphere of prejudice. "[Irvin and
Rideau] cannot be made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure
to... news accounts... alone presumptively deprives the defendant of
due process." 2
Because Murphy was decided after Duncan had applied the Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury to the states, 3 the Court could
review the state trial proceedings under a Sixth Amendment impartial
jury standard as well as the traditional due process review of Irvin and
Rideau. The Murphy Court crafted a new Sixth Amendment totality of
circumstances test to judge jury bias where a presumption of prejudice
was unjustified. Under the new test, the trial court must first decide if
the proceeding is more than a "hollow formality" of a trial. If it is, and
the circumstances do not warrant a presumption of prejudice under due
process standards, then the court must look for "any indications in the
totality of circumstances that the petitioner's trial was not fundamentally
fair" within the context of the Sixth Amendment. 4
The Murphy totality of circumstances test examines the same factors
considered by the Irvin court: media impact and voir dire testimony."
Most of the news articles about Murphy were factual in nature and ap-
peared almost seven months before the start of the trial.8 6 The voir dire
uncovered little juror hostility or pervasive bias. 7 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the totality of circumstances did not reveal sufficient prej-
udice to warrant a new trial.88
3. Distilling a Rule of Law
The two-prong due process test of Irvin v. Dowd states that (1) ex-
tensive adverse publicity, and (2) voir dire uncovering bias could create a
presumption of prejudice within a trial and overturn a jury's convic-
tion. 9 Rideau modified Irvin and held that extreme adverse publicity, if
dramatic enough, could alone create per se bias in a community and
therefore taint the entire jury pool.9" The Irvin/Rideau rule created a
81. "The proceedings in [Irvin, Rideau, and other cases] were entirely lacking in the so-
lemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system that subscribes to any notion
of fairness and rejects the verdict of a mob." Id at 799.
82. Id.
83. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
84. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 799.
85. Id. at 800-03.
86. Id. at 802.
87. Id
88. Id. at 802-03.
89. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961).
90. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
Fourteenth Amendment due process standard that looks at systemic cor-
ruption and asks, "Is it possible to select impartial jurors from this com-
munity?" To overrule a conviction using this test, an appellate court
would have to find that the trial was irreparably tainted by bias, and due
process thoroughly denied.
The 1974 Murphy decision concerned a trial environment which did
not rise to the due process presumption of prejudice standard formulated
in Irvin and Rideau. The Murphy court therefore established a totality of
circumstances standard to test for Sixth Amendment violations. The
Court weighed two factors for evidence to determine if a jury was imper-
missibly biased: the extent of prejudicial media surrounding the trial and
jury bias reflected in the voir dire process.91 Because Murphy was de-
cided subsequent to the Duncan ruling,92 the Murphy Court was able to
add to the existing Fourteenth Amendment due process protection-ar-
ticulated in Irvin and Rideau-a Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury without individual juror taint.
4. Standard of Review
If evidence of prejudice is found under either test, the reviewing
court must balance the weight of its findings against the firsthand impres-
sion of the presiding judge. "[T]he trial court's resolution of such ques-
tions is entitled . . . to 'special deference.' "91 There are situations,
however, where voir dire is inadequate to uncover bias.94 To overturn a
trial judge's evaluation of taint, the higher court must find "manifest er-
ror" in the lower court's ruling.95 If the Court determines that the envi-
ronment surrounding the trial meets the presumption of prejudice test,
then Irvin holds that a juror's "statement of impartiality can be given
little weight" by the trial judge, and lack of further inquiry during voir
dire may be manifest error.96 On the other hand, in the absence of preju-
dice per se, a judge reviewing a voir dire transcript for Sixth Amendment
claims of individual juror bias may accept a trial court's finding of non-
bias "after [a] ... voir dire proceeding designed specifically to identify
biased veniremen.
' '97
This tension between protecting a defendant's rights and deferring
to the judgment of the trial judge has led to uneven decisionmaking. The
91. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 800-03.
92. Duncan applied the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury to the states.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
93. Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984).
94. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
95. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156
(1878).
96. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728. For a discussion of manifest error, see infra text accompanying
notes 98-102.
97. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038; see infra text accompanying notes 181-86.
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next section will focus on what "manifest error" really means in the con-
text of jury selection.
II. The Standard of Review: Must "Manifest Error"
Be Manifest?
A. Deference to the Trial Court
Voir dire and jury selection are procedures conducted within the
purview of the trial judge. As the Reynolds Court warned over a hun-
dred years ago, "The finding of the trial court upon [juror bias] ought not
be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest.""8 A re-
viewing court will therefore grant trial judges a presumption of correct-
ness when they review their evaluations of non-bias.99
The Supreme Court is still hesitant to allow appellate courts to re-
verse a lower court judge's firsthand evaluation of jurors from a "cold
record." There are many reasons for such deference. The manner and
demeanor of the jurors during voir dire are often more revealing than
their answers, and a trial judge may evaluate their credibility first-
hand."° Deference also engenders finality. With a more stringent stan-
dard of review, the trial court could become "an 'entrance gate' for fact
collecting subject to appellate" scrutiny, and lose all authority as a final
arbitrator.10'
Other courts have interpreted and clarified the Reynolds rule. The
Seventh Circuit, for example, held that a court's voir dire technique does
not establish grounds for reversal unless there is a clear abuse of discre-
tion.'0 2 Thus, not only the trial judge's evaluation of juror bias, but the
court's method of inquiry can be immune, to some extent, from review.
B. Constraints on Judicial Voir Dire
1. What Must a Judge Ask?
Despite a high standard of deference to the procedure and judgment
of the trial court, a judge must ask or allow counsel to ask certain ques-
tions during voir dire. For example, the defendant has a right to have
potential jurors questioned about ethnic prejudices if the prejudices
might reasonably affect the jury.10 A defendant also has a right to ex-
98. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878). See also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S.
717, 723 (1961).
99. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1984).
100. Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 428.
101. Id. at 428 n.10 (citing O'Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365, 392 (5th Cir. 1983) (Higgin-
botharn, J., concurring specially)).
102. United States v. Banks, 687 F.2d 967, 975-76 (7th Cir. 1982).
103. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981).
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amine jurors about racial and other serious prejudices."° Such question-
ing into racial prejudice is a vital safeguard of due process. 115 Although
the Supreme Court has focused its Sixth Amendment review of voir dire
on racial prejudice, several circuits have, by analogy, called on the trial
courts to make good faith explorations into broader sources of bias, in-
cluding pretrial exposure to media.
2. The Grey Zone: Has the Judge Asked Enough?
Beyond subjects like race and ethnicity, the Supreme Court allows
the trial judge much discretion in voir dire procedures.10 6 In an attempt
to rein in what has become an ad hoc process, many of the circuit courts
have begun to define guidelines for review of voir dire.
The Fifth Circuit has held that the standard of review should be
"whether the means employed to test impartiality have created a reason-
able assurance that prejudice would be discovered if present."10 7 The
Tenth Circuit held that a judge has a "duty" to ask questions that would
reveal prejudice.10 8 Moreover, in the Tenth Circuit the trial court must
consider the perspectives of both the prosecution and the defense in se-
lecting which questions to ask.10 9 If a trial shows signs of potential prej-
udice, the judge has an obligation to ask more probing questions. 110
These standards allow an appellate court to examine the thoroughness of
a trial judge's voir dire. If questions about certain subjects are not asked,
then the reviewing court may have grounds for questioning the impartial-
ity of the jury.
Several circuits, including the Ninth, have offered more focused dis-
cussion about voir dire in a trial preceded by extensive adverse media
coverage. In Silverthorne v. United States,II' the Ninth Circuit held that
a trial judge's evaluation of non-bias can be reversed "when pre-trial pub-
licity is great" and the judge merely "obtain[s] jurors' assurances of im-
partiality" during voir dire." 2 A District of Columbia Circuit decision
104. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 31 (1986); Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308,
313 (1931).
105. Even the Mu'Min court conceded that "the possibility of racial prejudice against a
black defendant charged with a violent crime against a white person is sufficiently real that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that inquiry be made into racial prejudice.... ." Mu'Min v.
Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1904 (1991).
106. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189-90 (1981).
107. United States v. Shavers, 615 F.2d 266, 268 (5th Cir. 1980). The court held that it
was abuse of discretion for the trial court not to ask the venire specific questions. Because the
defendant was charged with assault with a deadly weapon, the court stated that the defendant
had a right to ask the prospective jurors whether they had been crime victims. Id.
108. United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198, 201 (10th Cir. 1980).
109. Id.
110. Id. at n.2.
111. 400 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1968).
112. Id. at 637-38.
Winter 19931
452 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 20:439
embraced Silverthorne when it held that a judge should use voir dire to
explore issues about which "the local community or the population at
large is commonly known to harbor strong feelings that may stop short
of presumptive bias in law yet significantly skew deliberations in fact."' 11
In other words, the trial judge should evaluate the atmosphere surround-
ing the trial and conduct voir dire accordingly. A Tenth Circuit decision
warned that if jurors have viewed pre-trial media, "they must be ex-
amined with especial care to ensure that such publicity did not cause
them to form prejudices."'1 14 These cases reflect a consensus among
many courts that media exposure often engenders juror bias. They sug-
gest from practical experience that it is essential to probe jurors about
media in high profile trials using content questions or other methods of
inquiry during voir dire. Otherwise, biased jurors will take seats in the
jury box.
3. Can Lack of Record be "'Manifest Error?"
It is difficult for an appellate court to review Sixth Amendment
claims of insufficient voir dire. If the record does not overtly reflect juror
bias, then the defendant has little basis for challenging the discretion of
the trial judge.
A few judicial opinions have acknowledged the dilemma created by
sparse voir dire records. In a dissenting opinion from United States v.
Blanton,'15 Judge Engel of the Sixth Circuit explored the implications of
a trial judge's refusal to ask content questions during the voir dire in a
high profile case:
Although the trial court's finding [of impartiality] might be cor-
rect, there is no way on this record to probe that finding since the
record is silent on the extent of the veniremen's exposure to the
pretrial publicity and the ... extent of their personal reactions ....
[T]he court should have probed into the effect of the publicity upon
the prospective jurors."'
Without voir dire questioning about the effects of the media upon the
individual jurors, the dissent stated that the appellate court had no
means to estimate how the trial judge determined that this set of jurors
had not been prejudiced by exposure to the news. 1 7 In effect, the terse
record created a pocket of unreviewable decisionmaking.
A logical extension from the dissent in Blanton is that a court's fail-
ure to establish a sufficient voir dire record denies a defendant meaning-
ful opportunity to appeal on Sixth Amendment grounds, and therefore is
113. United States v. Robinson, 475 F.2d 376, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
114. United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 324 (10th Cir. 1976).
115. United States v. Blanton, 719 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1983).
116. Id. at 841 (Engel, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Blanton, 700 F.2d 298, 309-
10 (6th Cir. 1983)).
117. Id.
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itself manifest error. In Emmons v. State,' the trial judge refused re-
quests to put voir dire questioning about media bias on the trial rec-
ord. 19 The Indiana Supreme Court held that a trial judge's refusal to
record voir dire proceedings denied the defendant the opportunity for
appellate review."m Defendant's conviction was reversed by the Indiana
Supreme Court because it found abuse of discretion and manifest error in
the court's refusal to create a record of voir dire. 2 '
This Note will argue that when a trial's environment is charged with
prejudicial media attention, a judge's failure to probe for evidence of bias
during voir dire is the functional equivalent of turning off the record. An
empty record can reveal neither evidence to support nor refute juror im-
partiality. As a result, it denies the defendant a meaningful appeal and
constitutes manifest error.
I. Mu'Min v. Virginia
The Supreme Court considered for the first time whether a defend-
ant has a constitutional right to ask content questions during voir dire in
Mu'Mn v. Virginia.'22
A. Factual Background
Petitioner Mu'Min was convicted of first degree murder in 1973 and
sentenced to forty-eight years in prison.'2 3 While out of prison on work
detail, Mu'Min escaped and walked to a nearby shopping mall. 124 There,
he engaged in a fight with the owner of a carpet store over the cost of
oriental rugs and brutally stabbed her to death. 2 ' There was also evi-
dence that the victim had been raped.'26 Mu'Min then returned to his
work site in time to change his bloody shirt and join the crew for
118. 492 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. 1986).
119. "Defendant requested that voir dire be recorded because pretrial publicity had become
a concern and he wished to preserve the issue of juror bias for appeal." Id at 304. Although
voir dire was performed, it was not recorded by the court reporter. Id
120. Id. at 305.
121. "Judicial discretion should be exercised in a way which... facilitates and expedites
the trial of cases and appeals therefrom." Idk (emphasis added).
122. 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991).
123. Id. at 1901.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1911 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also John F. Harris, Suspect Describes Fatal
Dale City Stabbing, WASH. Posr, Dec. 7, 1988, at A9 ("'I started asking her questions,'
Mu'Min, 36, said near the end of the interrogation. 'She got insulted because I told her that
her prices were stupid. She started calling me names... and then I stabbed her twice.' ").
126. "Readers of local papers learned that [the victim] had been discovered in a pool of
blood, with her clothes pulled off and semen on her body." Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. 1911 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). See also Pierre Thomas, Inmate Said to Admit to Killing, Convict
Charged in Fatal Stabbing of Dale City Storekeeper, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1988, at C3
("[S]emen was found on the body.").
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lunch. 127
Substantial publicity surrounded the crime. 121 Community resi-
dents were exposed to graphic details of the "macabre" crime scene as
well as numerous confession statements made by the defendant and a
detailed history of his violent criminal record. 129 Public outrage over the
Mu'Min crime was exacerbated by simultaneous national coverage of
Willie Horton, who had become a symbol of violent crime in the 1988
presidential campaign. 130 Local politicians pronounced Mu'Min's guilt
to the community as they expressed policy concerns over the laxity of
state prison regulations.13'
B. Lower Court Decisions
Prior to trial, the petitioner moved for a change of venue due to the
pretrial publicity. 13 2 The trial judge refused to rule on the motion until
after an attempt to empanel a jury.'33 Prior to the start of trial, peti-
tioner offered the court sixty-four proposed voir dire questions and re-
quested individual voir dire.'3 4 The court denied individual voir dire and
refused to use any of petitioner's proposed content questions regarding
what individual jurors had heard in the news.
135
127. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1901, 1911 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1901. See also Pierre Thomas, Escapee's Murder Trial Opens: Store Owner
Slain in Woodbridge, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1989, at B3; Inmate's Murder Trial Set, WASH.
POST, Oct. 8, 1988, at B5; Pierre Thomas, Va. Officials Probe Prisoner's Escape From Work
Crew, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1988, at D3; Pierre Thomas, Va. Inmate Charged in Store Slaying:
Convicted Killer Was In Trusty Program, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1988, at B1.
129. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1911 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Those who read the detailed
reporting of Mu'Min's background would have come away with little doubt that Mu'Min was
fully capable of committing the brutal murder of which he was accused.").
130. IdL at 1910. Horton had raped and assaulted a woman while on prison furlough. See
infra note 178. See also Dana Priest, Va. Halts Furloughs for Inmates Convicted of Violent
Crimes, WASH. Posr, Nov. 24, 1988, atD1; Pierre Thomas, Va. Prisoners Banned From Urban
Road Crews: Bailes Acts After Prince William Slaying, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1988, at Dl.
131. "The local Congressman announced that he was 'deeply distressed by news that my
constituent Gladys Nopwasky was murdered by a convicted murderer serving in a highway
department work program."' Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1912 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1901. See also Brief for Petitioner at 9.
133. Id. at 1902. See also Brief for Petitioner at 10. Petitioner renewed his motion for
change of venue during voir dire, and it was denied by the court. Brief for Petitioner at 14.
134. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1902.
135. Id. See also Joint Appendix at 31-34 [hereinafter J.A.]. The trial judge based his
refusal to ask content questions on Virginia Supreme Court Rule 14A, which sets a minimum
standard for voir dire. Despite his claims of strict adherence to this rule, he permitted other
types of questions which were not set forth in the rule. Brief for the Petitioner at 11 n.13. The
content questions which the trial court refused to ask were:
[1]. Have you acquired any information about this case, from the newspapers, televi-
sion, conversations or any other source?
[2]. What have you seen, read or heard about this case?
[3]. From whom or what did you get this information?
[4]. When and where did you get this information?
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The trial judge questioned the venire as a group.136 From a panel of
twenty-six, sixteen answered that they had heard media reports about the
case.137 The judge then asked them to single themselves out if they could
not be impartial jurors based on the news they had heard:
Then considering what you've heard, or read, or what you know
about the case from whatever the source, do you believe that you
can enter the Jury box with an open mind, wait until the entire
case is presented before reaching a fixed opinion... as to the guilt
or innocence of the accused?
138
Only one of the sixteen potential jurors who had been exposed to media
admitted bias, and he was excused.
139
The court continued general voir dire of the venire in groups of
four.1'" Eight of the twelve jurors admitted that they had at one time or
another read or heard something about the case.141 Not one of the
twelve selected jurors had indicated during the voir dire any individual-
ized bias against the petitioner.142 The jury found Mu'Min guilty of first-
degree murder and recommended that he be sentenced to death.
143
The Virginia Supreme Court, by split vote, affirmed the conviction
by the trial court.'" It held that a defendant does not have a constitu-
tional right to demand content questions during voir dire.
145
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari 146 to the Supreme Court
of Virginia and affirmed in a five-to-four decision.
C. The U.S. Supreme Court Opinions
L Chief Justice Rehnquist's Majority Opinion
A five-member majority affirmed the decision of the Virginia
[5]. What did you discuss?
J.A. at 4-5. The trial court ruled that potential jurors would only be asked whether they had
been exposed to any media and whether the juror felt he or she was biased as a result. J.A. at
31-32.
136. J.A., supra note 135, at 42-66.
137. Brief for Petitioner at 12.
138. J.A., supra note 135, at 47-48.
139. Brief for Petitioner at 13.
140. Four more jurors were removed by the trial judge: two for bias and two for prejudices
related to the death penalty. Prosecution and defense counsel peremptorily challenged and
removed six jurors each. The remaining fourteen were empaneled as the twelve jurors and two




144. Mu'Min v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 886, 898 (Va. 1990).
145. Id at 893.
146. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 242, 243 (1990).
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Supreme Court.147 They held that a trial judge's refusal to allow pro-
spective jurors to be questioned about the content of the media to which
they had been exposed did not violate petitioner's Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury nor his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process. 
14 8
The majority began its analysis with an examination of the extent of
publicity surrounding the Mu'Min trial.149 In prior cases where the
Court had found that pretrial publicity had caused bias per se, either
two-thirds of the jurors stated that they had formed an opinion of the
defendant's guilt before trial, or else due process had been blatantly de-
nied and the defendant had been tried in the press. 1 0 Noting that none
of the twelve jurors in Mu'Min's case admitted to subjectivity and that
publicity surrounding his trial had not reached hysterical proportions,
the majority concluded that although media impact was substantial, it
failed to meet the standard of community-wide prejudice per se.' 5 '
The majority stated that for content questioning to rise to the level
of a constitutional requirement, it must not merely be helpful, but the
lack of such questioning must render the trial fundamentally unfair."12
When adverse publicity does not justify a presumption of prejudice, ju-
rors' professions of impartiality may be believed." 3 Therefore, a trial
judge's refusal to question jurors about the content of media exposure
need not impinge on a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impar-
tial jury or Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor argued in her concurrence that the Court should
focus on only one issue: Could the trial judge credit jurors' assurances of
impartiality without making further inquiry into the content of the media
that they had heard or read?1
4
Justice O'Connor concluded that the trial judge did not need to ask
potential jurors content questions.' She conceded that asking such
questions might give the trial court more insight into the specific attitude
147. The majority included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia,
and Souter. Justice O'Connor also filed a concurring opinion.
148. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908.
149. The majority's discussion included a differentiation between the Supreme Court's su-
pervisory role in reviewing federal decisions, and its more limited role of verifying the constitu-
tionality of state court decisions. Because Mu'Min is a state case, the Supreme Court could
only reverse for unconstitutional abuse of judicial discretion. Id. at 1904.
150. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1040 (1984); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723,
726-27 (1962); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961).
151. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1907.
152. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1905 (citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975)).
153. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1031.
154. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1909 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155. Id
of each juror. However, she did not view failure to ask content questions
a constitutional violation if the judge already knew the content of the
inflammatory publicity.
3. Justice Marshall's Dissent
156
Justice Marshall's dissent vigorously condemned the majority opin-
ion. He wrote, "Today's decision turns a critical constitutional guaran-
tee-the Sixth Amendment's right to an impartial jury-into a hollow
formality." He added that "[tihe majority's reasoning is unaccept-
able." 157 Justice Marshall chronicled the extensive prejudicial media sur-
rounding the crime and trial."5 8 In light of the charged environment,
Justice Marshall found it unacceptable that a prospective juror could
deem himself "unbiased" and constitutionally satisfy a trial judge's duty
to empanel an impartial jury.159 To refute the majority's holding, Justice
Marshall discussed the body of jurisprudence warning that jurors' asser-
tions of impartiality are not reliable.' 6°
He further argued that once jurors admitted exposure to publicity
surrounding a trial, content questioning is essential to determine if there
is prejudice per se. Moreover, content questioning is appropriate "trial
court fact finding" and failure to make such inquiry "does not merit ap-
pellate deference."''
Justice Marshall opposed the majority's suggestion that content
questioning was unduly burdensome in light of the constitutional impli-
cations of permitting a partial jury. 62 He concluded that Mu'Min's trial
156. Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens in all but part IV of the
opinion. Part IV of Marshall's dissent stated:
Even if I were to believe that the procedures employed at Mu'Min's jury selection
satisfied the requirements of the Sixth Amendment, I still would vacate his death
sentence. I adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and
unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 1917 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
157. Id. at 1909-10.
158. Id at 1910-12.
159. Id. at 1912-16.
160. Id at 1913 ("[Ain individual 'juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias
... [or] may be unaware of it.' ") (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221-22 (1982)
(concurring opinion)); United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 375 (7th Cir. 1972) ("Natural
human pride would suggest a negative answer to whether there was a reason the juror could
not be fair and impartial.").
161. Mu'Min, IIl S. Ct. at 1915 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162. Justice Marshall quoted former Justice Hughes's response to a similar contention sixty
years earlier:
The argument is advanced on behalf of the Government that it would be detrimental
to the administration of the law in the courts of the United States to allow questions
to jurors as to racial or religious prejudices. We think that it would be far more
injurious to permit it to be thought that persons entertaining a disqualifying preju-
dice were allowed to serve as jurors and that inquiries designed to elicit the fact of
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was tainted by Rideau-style prejudice per se.
163
4. Justice Kennedy's Dissent
Justice Kennedy's brief dissent criticized Justice Marshall's dissent
for blurring the lines between a per se prejudicial environment and bias
harbored by individual jurors. 164 Justice Kennedy concluded that the
presumption of prejudice rule did not apply to Mu'Min's case. 165 Con-
sidering the extent of the pre-trial publicity, however, he concluded that
the judge-conducted voir dire "was inadequate for an informed ruling
that the jurors were qualified to sit."'
166
Unlike the majority, Justice Kennedy concluded that a reviewing
court's deference to the trial court's findings should be predicated on the
lower court's creation of a sufficient voir dire record. 167 "Our willingness
to accord substantial deference to a trial court's finding of juror imparti-
ality rests on our expectation that the trial court will conduct a sufficient
voir dire to determine the credibility of a juror professing to be impar-
tial."' 168 He did not find that the Mu'Min court performed adequate voir
dire, 169 and thus dissented.
IV. A Critique of Mu'Min: Judicial Efficiency Strikes Due
Process a Hard Blow
A. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Majority Opinion
The majority opinion failed to apply the Murphy totality of circum-
stances test accurately to the Mu'Min scenario. 70 The majority criti-
cized petitioner's reliance on Irvin v. Dowd 17 1 and went to great lengths
to differentiate Irvin from the case at hand. 172 Finding that Mu'Min's
trial was not surrounded by a wave of adverse passion such as existed in
disqualification were barred. No surer way could be devised to bring the processes of
justice into disrepute.
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1931).
163. 111 S. Ct. at 1915 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
164. Id at 1918 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
165. Id at 1918.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1918-19.
168. Id at 1919.
169. "[Findings of impartiality must be based on something more than the mere silence of
the individual in response to questions asked en masse." Id.
170. Under Murphy, if the atmosphere surrounding the trial does not rise to a presumption
of prejudice, the Court should then look at the totality of circumstances surrounding the trial
for indicia of an unconstitutionally biased jury. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975). See
supra text accompanying notes 78-88.
171. 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (extreme adverse publicity and voir dire uncovering bias can
create a presumption of prejudice). See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
172. "[Ihe cases differ both in the kind of community in which the coverage took place
and in extent of media coverage." As a result of adverse publicity, two-thirds of the Irvin
the Irvin community, Justice Rehnquist's opinion concluded that the
Mu'Min trial was not biased per se.173 This Note agrees with the major-
ity that the Mu'Min trial was not surrounded by a presumptively prejudi-
cial environment. Although media coverage of the Mu'Min crime was
extensive, the community reaction did not turn the trial proceedings into
a circus as in Irvin and Rideau.174 Nevertheless, this Note will argue that
the majority did not look for Sixth Amendment Murphy-style taint in the
Mu'Min jury, and therefore the majority's analysis was incomplete.
A trial that does not suffer from a due process "community-wide"
presumption of prejudice may still be flawed. The Sixth Amendment
guarantees that the jurors, individually and as a whole, will be impartial.
Murphy instructs that when media impact is significant but does not
reach a presumption of prejudice, the court must evaluate jury bias by
weighing the effect of the prejudicial news and the voir dire testimony.
175
The Mu'Min majority failed to conduct this second level of analysis, and
thus never performed the totality of circumstances balancing test man-
dated by its earlier decisions.
176
Mu'Min has similarities to Murphy. In both cases the media publi-
cized the crime extensively and informed the community of the defend-
ant's prior criminal record. The Murphy Court held that under the
totality of circumstances there was insufficient evidence to find jury bias
in that trial. 177 The Mu'Min murder case, in contrast, involved a much
more violent crime than the Murphy robbery. It became a local source of
political debate in the context of the national Willie Horton presidential
ad campaign.1 78 Moreover, the pretrial releases of defendant Mu'Min's
confessions, coupled with statements by local politicians emphasizing
their belief in his guilt, indicate that Mu'Min was tried in a much more
prejudicial environment than that which surrounded the Murphy trial.
L Through a Glass Darkly: Sleight of Hand in the Rehnquist Test
The prejudicial setting of the Mu'Min trial requires the reviewing
court to examine the totality of circumstances to evaluate whether indi-
vidual jurors were biased. Courts should perform this test by examining
the voir dire testimony within the context of the prejudicial media.179
Instead, the majority decided that because adverse publicity of the
jurors had formed an opinion before the trial, whereas none of the Mu'Min jurors admitted to
having formed an opinion. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1906-07.
173. Id. at 1907.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 49-76 and accompanying text.
175. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800-03 (1975).
176. Id. at 799.
177. Id. at 803.
178. See, e.g., David Lauter, Repeated Horton References, Prison Ad Cited; Bentsen, Jack-
son Accuse Bush of Using Racism, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1988, at A15.
179. Id.
Winter 19931 MEDIA BIAS IN JURY SELECTION
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY
Mu'Min trial did not rise to a presumption of prejudice, juror assurances
of impartiality should be believed.'80
This conclusion works inverse logic on the PattonI "l opinion. Pat-
ton involved a defendant whose first trial for a notorious murder was
surrounded by extensive media coverage. When his conviction was re-
versed on appeal and he was retried and convicted five years later for the
same crime, Patton filed a habeas corpus petition claiming jury bias.'8 2
The Patton court reasoned, invoking the language of Irvin, that when
there is a presumption of prejudice within the community, a court cannot
rely on jurors' claims of impartiality.8 3 Because Patton's second trial
did not involve a per se prejudicial "wave of public passion" '184 as in
Irvin, the Irvin scrutiny does not apply: "We do not think [this rationale]
can be extended to a... case in which the partiality of an individual juror
is placed in issue."'18 ' Thus under a Sixth Amendment totality of cir-
cumstances analysis for individual juror taint, "the question is whether
there is fair support in the record for the state court's conclusion that the
jurors here would be impartial."' 8 6 Absent a community-wide presump-
tion of prejudice, the Court is likely to believe a juror's assurances of
non-bias if there is a strong voir dire record to support the trial judge's
finding.
The Mu'Min Court eliminated the Irvin/Patton bifurcated review
for bias. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote,
In Patton, we acknowledged that 'adverse pretrial publicity can
create such a presumption of prejudice in a community that the
jurors' claims that they can be impartial should not be believed,'
but this is not such a case. Had the trial court in this case been
confronted with [a] 'wave of public passion' . . . the Fourteenth
Amendment might well have required more extensive examination
of potential jurors than it undertook here.' 7
The majority turned a requirement for further questioning of jurors
whenever there is a presumption of prejudice into unreviewable believabil-
ity of jurors whenever there is not a presumption of prejudice. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's smoke and mirrors shift of the Irvin rule effectively
eliminated the second stage of the Murphy totality of circumstances
test. ' He failed to conduct a Patton analysis to see whether there was
fair support for the judge's determination of non-bias within the voir dire
record. Instead of balancing the voir dire testimony and the media envi-
180. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. 1907. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031 (1984).
181. Patton, 467 U.S. 1025. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
182. 467 U.S. at 1028.
183. Id. at 1031.
184. Id. at 1033 (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961)).
185. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1036 (emphasis added).
186. IdL at 1038 (emphasis added).
187. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1907 (citing Patton, 467 U.S. at 1031 (emphasis added)).
188. See supra notes 78-92 and accompanying text.
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ronment by careful examination of the record, the majority allowed the
jurors' bald assurances of non-bias"8 9 to substantiate the trial judge's con-
clusion that the group was impartial, and thus terminated the analysis.19
The substitution of the Irvin-mirror rule1 91 for the Irvin/Patton
192
bifurcated test fails to sufficiently safeguard a defendant's rights. Numer-
ous decisions have warned against the unreliability of a juror's self-evalu-
ation when testing for bias.193 Moreover, the majority's extreme
deference to the judgment of the trial court and acceptance of a silent
voir dire record make it nearly impossible for a petitioner to prove mani-
fest error upon review.
2. Unreviewable Error and Denial of Due Process
Chief Justice Rehnquist's standard of review requires reversal only if
the trial judge commits an affirmative error that is visible in the trial
record. The Mu'Min record is vacuous: the trial judge asked only a few
group-directed questions and failed to pierce the veil of individual juror
bias. A petitioner who claims that the trial court has made an error of
omission rather than commission will not be able to remedy a biased
verdict. By accepting the trial judge's limited voir dire as a sufficient
evaluation of the Sixth Amendment right to jury impartiality, the major-
ity leaves the petitioner with nothing to point to in the record as visibly
"manifest" error. As a result, Mu'Min deprives defendants of a mean-
189. These assurances were silent, for the judge only asked the venire, as a group, to single
themselves out if they privately harbored bias. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1919 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Justice Kennedy argued that because the trial judge had no way to evaluate credi-
bility, his determination should be given little deference. Id.
190. See United States v. Blanton, 719 F.2d 815, 834 (6th Cir. 1983) (Engel, J., dissenting).
Judge Engel wrote in his dissent, "[T]o my knowledge, no court of appeals has ever ... af-
firmed a conviction in a case of widespread and inflammatory pretrial publicity when the entire
voir dire concerning publicity consisted of a single question eliciting only a juror assurance
(through silence) of impartiality ... ." Id at 834.
191. I call Chief Justice Rehnquist's new analysis the "Irvin-mirror rule" because it at first
appears to be the logical inverse of Irvin, but upon closer scrutiny it has little substance. The
presence of community-wide prejudice requires examination of jurors beyond their assurances
of non-bias. Therefore, under the "mirror rule," the absence of a presumption of prejudice
allows a court to rely on mere assurances by jurors that they are not biased. The problem with
the "Irvin-mirror rule" is that contrary to the Murphy holding, it ignores the significance of
jury prejudice that does not rise to the level of a presumption of prejudice. It appears that the
Court is now willing to accept the risk of criminal verdicts where a juror or two may have
concealed their biases.
192. The Irvin/Patton bifurcated test requires different standards of review based upon the
level of prejudice. Under Irvin, the reviewing judge must not trust a juror's assertions of im-
partiality in a per se prejudicial environment. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 728. In a setting absent a
presumption of prejudice, Patton holds that the reviewing court may rely on jurors' assurances
documented in extended voir dire. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038.
193. See supra note 150.
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ingful appeal and therefore denies them due process.
1 94
B. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion attempts to supplement the
sparse Mu'Min voir dire record by suggesting that judicial knowledge of
"content" was gained through news articles in evidence, and therefore
the judge had an "objective" basis for evaluating the extent of media
prejudice.195 Her reasoning fails, however, because she does not require
trial judges to use their objective knowledge of the news accounts to eval-
uate the subjective effects of media on the individuals seated as jurors.
As a result, Justice O'Connor's approach still leaves the personal biases
of the jury unprobed.
V. Proposal: A Compromise
The Mu'Min majority held that content questioning is unnecessary
during voir dire in high profile trials that fail to create a presumption of
prejudice. 196 Undoubtedly, the Court was hesitant to open the door to
habeas review of what must have been, on the local level, a decision
based on judicial efficiency. Because state resources are limited, the ma-
jority refused to dictate specific guidelines as to how a trial judge should
conduct voir dire.1 97 As a result, the Rehnquist opinion drew a line at
prejudice per se. The majority ignored the Murphy totality of circum-
stances test and sanctioned the "impartiality" finding of the trial judge
despite its lack of grounding in the voir dire record.
This decision creates a loophole by allowing a zone of unreviewable
judicial decisionmaking. If a trial is subjected to significant media atten-
tion (though not enough to create a presumption of prejudice), the de-
fendant has the burden of proof when alleging on appeal that the jury
was biased. 198 The defendant must show that the trial judge committed
manifest error by empaneling a biased jury. 9 9 But because the Mu'Min
majority is willing to sanction a virtually empty voir dire record in defer-
ence to the local trial judge, there is nothing in the record to which a
defendant may point and label as an affirmative error. The trial court's
errors of omission are thus unreviewable, and the petitioner's loss of op-
194. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). "[A] State is not required by the Federal'
Constitution to provide ... a right to appellate review at all .... But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates... ." Griffin, 351
U.S. at 18. As a result of Griffin, when a state grants defendants an appeal of right, they must,
under the Fourteenth Amendment, allow that appeal to be "meaningful."
195. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
196. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908.
197. Id
198. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426 n.7 (1985).
199. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156
(1878).
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portunity to prove his appeal is a due process violation.2 ' °
It is difficult to determine from the Mu'Min voir dire record whether
the trial judge had any real idea whether the jurors he empaneled were
biased or not. Mu'Min was convicted of murder and sentenced to death
by a jury that may or may not have been impartial.
A. A Capital Standard
The courts have traditionally offered greater safeguards for the
rights of capital defendants.2 1 The Irvin Court focused on the weight of
a capital conviction in its conclusion: "With his life at stake, it is not
requiring too much that the petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undis-
turbed by so huge a wave of public passion .... -"22 In Turner v. Mur-
ray, the Court vacated a capital sentence because inadequate voir dire
created "unacceptable risk of racial prejudice infecting the capital sen-
tencing proceeding."2 3 In 1983, the Court wrote that "the qualitative
difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspond-
ingly greater degree of scrutiny."2" Moreover, the Court has struck
down death sentences when it has found that "the circumstances under
which they were imposed 'created an unacceptable risk that the death
penalty [may have been] meted out arbitrarily or capriciously' or through
'whim or mistake.' ,,20
Arguably, the Mu'Min majority balanced the pressures for judicial
efficiency with the costs of one small loophole and found it most prudent
to avoid second-guessing the decisions of local courts. But nowhere in
the equation did the majority weigh their margin of error against
Mu'Min's death sentence.20 6
The Court should require content questions in capital cases. While
the Mu'Min majority may find that trial efficiency outweighs due process
appellate rights in most cases, the Court traditionally has guarded capital
trials with a higher standard for voir dire questions and should continue
to do so.
B. Mu'Min Sets the Stage for State Response
The Mu'Min decision holds that a defendant has no constitutional
right to demand content questioning during voir dire in order to probe
200. This is because without a "meaningful" voir dire record, an appeal premised on jury
bias cannot be meaningful. See supra note 194.
201. But see Herrera v. Collins, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1993) (limiting extra protections nor-
mally granted to capital defendants to trial proceedings, and not to habeas corpus petitions).
202. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1960) (emphasis added).
203. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 37 (1986).
204. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983).
205. Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. at 35-36 (citing Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 343
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
206. Or if they did, they did not address it in the opinion.
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for media bias.2 7 Moreover, a trial judge may rely on the silent acquies-
cence of the potential jurors, to infer that they do not perceive themselves
as impermissibly prejudiced, and upon this basis dismiss the existence of
bias.2"8 Because of the Court's holding, defendants will unfortunately
continue to lose appellate rights through the Mu'Min loophole without
federal protection. The fate of content questioning will be played out in
the states.
The Mu'Min loophole arose because the Supreme Court did not
want to impose standards on the voir dire procedures of local state
courts.20 9 Instead of allowing the federal gap in rights to stand, states
should read the Mu'Min decision as a signal to take action in local
policymaking.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, state courts and legisla-
tures do have supervisory discretion to regulate local trial courts. As a
result, they could direct standards for voir dire procedure without having
to point to a constitutional error. Moreover, the issue of judicial effi-
ciency is a singularly local issue. Local policymakers can evaluate and
weigh the burden of protection on their own system.
Since Mu'Min, only action by states will secure content questioning
and essential appellate rights of defendants. States have a duty to grant
their citizens, at a minimum, rights equal to the Federal Constitution.
States may, however, bestow greater rights upon their residents. In Con-
necticut, for example, the Mu'Min problem will never arise because the
state constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to have an
attorney question each juror individually.210 New York, a strong guard-
ian of defendants' rights, has enacted a statute in its criminal procedure
code to ensure that the defendant, as well as the prosecutor and judge,
may question the venire.211 In addition to legislative action, where state
constitutions provide more constitutional rights than are guaranteed in
the United States Constitution, state courts may close up the Mu'Min
loophole through judicial decisions.
VI. Conclusion
States should weigh heavily the United States Supreme Court's
warnings against sloppy jury selection in capital cases when a defendant's
207. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908.
208. Id.
209. The Supreme Court has discretionary power to regulate federal voir dire, but may
only censure state voir dire for violating the Constitution. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1903.
210. CONN. CONST. art. I, § 19.
211. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.15 (West 1993). See also People v. Antommarchi, 80
N.Y.2d 247 (1992), a controversial decision out of New York's highest court that recognized a
criminal defendant's fundamental right under the state constitution to be present during voir
dire side bars. This case is a compelling example of a state court taking a stand to fill in a gap
it perceives in defendants' rights left by federal courts.
life hangs in the balance. The concerns of Justice Frankfurter are no less
true today: "More than one student of society has expressed the view
that not the least significant test of the quality of a civilization is its treat-
ment of those charged with a crime, particularly with offenses which
arouse the passions of a community." '2 12 When balancing judicial effi-
ciency needs against the rights of capital defendants, states should con-
clude that the small burden of content questioning far outweighs the
economic costs of appeal and the social costs of lost systemic integrity.
212. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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